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MEMBERS OF ALLEN & OVERY LLP, MEMBERS OF ASHURST, KAREN BERG, AND
MEMBERS OF BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP*
I. Securities Developments in the United States
A. RULES UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY AcT OF 2002
Throughout 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) continued to pro-
mulgate final rules pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley).' These
rules varied in scope and were instituted to address the weaknesses in corporate governance
and financial reporting that led to many of the recent corporate scandals.
1. Code of Ethics and Audit Committee Financial Expert Disclosure Requirements
With an eye to reforming corporate governance, the SEC on January 23, 2003, issued
final rules under sections 406 and 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley requiring reporting companies to
include certain disclosures in their filings with the SEC.'
a. Code of Ethics
Under the rules, an issuer must state whether it has adopted a code of ethics for its
principal executive and financial officers and, if not, the reasons therefore, as well as any
amendments to, or waivers from, any provision of that code of ethics. The rules define
"code of ethics" as written standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and
to promote: (1) honest and ethical conduct, including the handling of conflicts of interest
between personal and professional relationships; (2) full, fair, accurate, timely and under-
standable disclosure in reports and documents that an issuer files with the SEC; (3) com-
pliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and regulations; (4) prompt internal
*Section I, Securities Developments in the United States, was contributed by members of Allen & Overy
LLP; Section II, Developments in the United Kingdom, was contributed by members of Ashurst in London;Section M, Developments in The Netherlands, was contributed by Karen Berg, an advocaat at De Brauw
Blackstone Westbroek P.C. in New York; Section IV, Developments in Canada, was contributed by members
of Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP in Toronto.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003).
2. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110,
corrected in 68 Fed. Reg. 15353 (Mar. 3, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229)).
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reporting to an appropriate person of any violations of the code; and (5) accountability for
failure to adhere to the code.
b. Audit Committee Financial Expert
A reporting company must also disclose that its board of directors has determined that
the company either: (1) has at least one audit committee financial expert serving on its audit
committee, or (2) does not have an audit committee financial expert serving on its audit
committee and explain its lack thereof. In addition, the company is required to disclose
whether the individual identified as the audit committee financial expert is independent of
management, although foreign private issuers are currently exempt from this requirement.
An "audit committee financial expert" is defined as a person who has:
(i) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and financial state-
ments;
(ii) the ability to assess the general application of such principles in connection with the
accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves;
(iii) experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements that present
a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are comparable to issues rea-
sonably expected to be raised by the company's financial statements, or experience actively
supervising such activities;
(iv) an understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting; and
(v) an understanding of audit committee functions.'
In the case of a foreign private issuer, the audit committee financial expert's understand-
ing must comply with the GAAPs used by the foreign private issuer in preparing its primary
financial statements filed with the SEC.
2. Certifications Regarding Internal Controls over Financial Reporting
Additional rules issued pursuant to sections 302 and 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley require all
issuers, both U.S. and non-U.S. SEC-reporting companies, to make certain certifications
to the SEC as to the accuracy of financial statements and the adequacy of disclosure controls
and internal controls.4 Violations of these requirements could subject the certifying officer
to civil and criminal liability.
The rules pursuant to section 302 require reporting companies to include in their annual
report filings on Forms 10-K, 40-F and 20-F separate certifications by their principal ex-
ecutive officer and principal financial officer that he or she has reviewed the report being
filed. The certifying officer must state that to his or her knowledge: (1) the report does not
contain any material untrue statement or omission; and (2) the financial statements and
financial information in the report fairly present, in all material respects, the financial con-
dition, results of operations, and cash flows of the issuer.
In doing so, the certifying officer is required to address the adequacy of the company's
disclosure controls and procedures. He or she must state that the certifying officers are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures. This in-
cludes: (1) designing such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material infor-
3. Reg. S-K, Item 401(h) § 229.401.
4. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure
in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release Nos. 8238,26068,47986 (une 5, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 and 274).
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mation relating to the issuer is made known to them; (2) evaluating the effectiveness of the
issuer's disclosure controls and procedures; and (3) presenting their conclusions about the
effectiveness of these controls and procedures.
In addition, the certifying officer must certify that he or she has disclosed to the issuer's
auditors and to the audit committee all significant deficiencies in the design or operation
of internal controls and any fraud that involved management or other employees who have
a significant role in the issuer's internal controls. The certifying officer must also report
any significant changes in internal controls.
The section 906 rules require that each periodic report filed to the SEC be accompanied
by a certification by the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer that: (1) the
report fully complies with the requirements of the Exchange Act; and (2) the information
contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the company.
3. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
On January 29, 2003, the SEC adopted a final rule pursuant to section 307 of Sarbanes-
Oxley establishing standards of professional conduct for attorneys who appear and practice
before the SEC.' The rule requires such attorneys to report evidence of material violations
of the securities laws, breaches of fiduciary duty, or similar violations, first to certain direc-
tors and officers of the issuer, then to higher authorities within the organization if the initial
response is inappropriate. This obligation is referred to as "up-the-ladder" reporting. Sup-
plementing this obligation, the SEC also proposed rules that require attorneys to report
such violations directly to the SEC in certain circumstances.
a. Applicability
The scope of the rule is limited to those attorneys who "appear and practice" before the
SEC.6 An attorney will be found to appear and practice if he or she: (1) transacts any business
with the SEC, including communication in any form; (2) represents an issuer in connection
with any SEC proceeding, investigation, inquiry, information request, or subpoena;(3) provides advice in respect of U.S. securities laws and regulations regarding any document
that the attorney has notice will be filed with the SEC; or (4) advises an issuer as to whether
information, a statement, an opinion, or other writing is required under U.S. securities law
or the SEC's rules.
The rule further exempts "non-appearing foreign attorneys" from the "up-the-ladder"
reporting requirement.7 The term "non-appearing foreign attorneys" includes attorneys:(1) who are admitted in a jurisdiction outside of the United States; (2) who do not hold
themselves out as practicing and do not give legal advice regarding U.S. federal or state
securities or other laws; and (3) whose appearance and practice before the SEC occurs only
5. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (Feb. 26,
2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
6. "Appearing and practicing" is defined broadly to include those attorneys who advise an issuer that a
document need not be incorporated into an SEC filing and those attorneys who provide legal services to anissuer, including persons or entities controlled by the issuer, i.e., where an attorney-client relationship exists,
and who have notice that they are advising on material that will come before the SEC. The rule does not apply
to attorneys who do not intend, or are not aware, that documents they prepared will be submitted to, orincorporated by reference into, a document that will be submitted to the SEC. See id.
7. Supra note 5.
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incidentally to, and in the ordinary course of, the attorney's practice of law in a jurisdiction
outside of the United States or in consultation with U.S. counsel. Additionally, foreign
attorneys do not have to comply with the rule if doing so conflicts with applicable foreign
law.
b. The Reporting Obligation
An attorney who, based on credible evidence, believes that a material violation of the
securities law, material breach of fiduciary duty, or similar violation by the issuer or by any
officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur, is required to report this to the issuer's chief legal officer (CLO) and/or chief ex-
ecutive officer (CEO) or the equivalent.,
Once an attorney has reported a material violation, the issuer's CLO and/or CEO must
conduct an inquiry into the reported violation and inform the attorney of any proposed
response. If the reporting attorney reasonably does not believe that the response is appro-
priate, the attorney, within a reasonable time, must report the material violation to either
the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or to the full board of
directors.9
Alternatively, if the issuer has implemented a qualified legal compliance committee
(QLCC), an attorney may satisfy his or her entire reporting obligation by reporting evi-
dence of material violations directly to the QLCC.1° If formed, the QLCC is responsible
for: (1) initiating an investigation by the CLO or by outside counsel; (2) recommending an
appropriate response; and (3) reporting to the CLO, the CEO, the audit committee, or the
board. Decisions and actions of the QLCC must be based on a majority vote. The QLCC
8. As used in the rule, credible evidence is such evidence that would be unreasonable, under the circum-
stances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. Id.
9. The rule defines an "appropriate response" as a response that provides a basis for an attorney reasonably
to believe that:
(1) no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, or
(2) the issuer has, as necessary, adopted remedial measures, including appropriate steps or sanctions
to stop, to prevent and/or remedy any material violation, and to minimize the likelihood of its
recurrence; or
(3) the issuer, with the consent of the appropriate internal body, has retained or directed an attorney
to review the reported evidence of a material violation and either:
(i) has substantially implemented any remedial recommendations made by such attorney; or
(ii) has been advised that such attorney may, consistent with his or her professional obligations,
assert a colorable defense in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceedings relating
to the reported evidence of a material violation. The Rule further details the reporting obli-
gation of attorneys retained by the issuer to investigate evidence of a material violation or to
assert a colorable defense.
Instead of first reporting the material violation to the CLO or CEO, a reporting attorney may also report the
material violation directly to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors or to the full
board of directors if he or she believes it would be futile to report the material violation to the CLO or CEO.
Id.
10. A QLCC is comprised of at least one member of the issuer's audit committee (or equivalent), and two
or more members of the issuer's board, all of whom must be independent. It must be duly authorized by the
issuer's board and investigate reports of a material violation according to written procedures. The QLCC may
be the audit committee or other committee as long as that committee agrees to function as a QLCC in addition
to its separate duties and meets the criteria for a QLCC. A CLO may also report the matter to the QLCC in
lieu of conducting an inquiry. See id.
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also may notify the SEC in the event that the issuer fails to implement an appropriate
response recommended by the QLCC.
c. Additional Permitted Action
Additionally, the rule permits, but does not require, an attorney to disclose confidential
client information relating to his or her representation of an issuer before the SEC without
the issuer's consent
(1) in connection with any investigation, proceeding, or litigation in which the attorney's
compliance with [the rule] is in issue; or
(2) to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary: (i) to prevent the issuer from
committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or investors; (ii) to prevent the issuer, in an [SEC] inves-
tigation or administrative proceeding from committing perjury, (... ) suboming perjury,
(... ) or committing any act (... ) that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the [SEC]; or
(iii) to rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may
cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in
the furtherance of which the attorney's services were used.
Alternatively, the attorney may withdraw if he or she concludes that the issuer has not
responded appropriately within a reasonable time, and the attorney reasonably believes that
a material violation is ongoing or is about to occur and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or of investors. As part of this "noisy
withdrawal," an attorney may: (1) withdraw from representing the issuer, in the case of
external counsel; (2) notify the SEC of such withdrawal, indicating that it was for profes-
sional considerations, in the case of external counsel, or was based on the intention to
disaffirm certain documents, in the case of in-house counsel; and (3) disaffirm a filing or
submission to the SEC that the attorney has assisted in preparing and reasonably believes
is or may be materially false or misleading.2
The proposed "noisy withdrawal" requirement elicited a large number of comment let-
ters from the practitioner community. Accordingly, the SEC extended the comment period
and proposed an alternative withdrawal procedure that still requires withdrawal of the at-
torney but requires the issuer (rather than the attorney) to publicly notify the SEC of the
attorney's withdrawal. If the issuer fails to notify the SEC of the attorney's withdrawal, the
attorney may (but is not required to) inform the SEC that the attorney has withdrawn due
to professional considerations. 3
Under both withdrawal proposals, the issuer's CLO would be required to inform any
attorney retained or employed to replace the withdrawing attorney that the previous at-
torney's withdrawal was based on professional considerations; in neither case will an attor-
ney who notifies the SEC of his or her withdrawal and/or disaffirms a filing be found to
have violated attorney-client privilege.
4. Auditor Independence
In addition to regulations designed to improve corporate governance within a company's
management, the SEC also focused on the role of external auditors and issued final rules
11. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (2004).
12. Supra note 5.
13. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed
Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 208, 240, and 249).
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pursuant to section 208(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley strengthening existing requirements regarding
auditor independence.4 These rules regulate the provision of non-audit services to a com-
pany by a public accounting firm, mandate more diligent management oversight of auditing
services, and ensure increased auditor independence.
a. Non-audit Services
A registered public accounting firm may not provide certain non-audit services to an
issuer while also providing audit services. These rules are governed by the principles that
an auditor cannot: (1) audit its own work; (2) function as part of management or as an
employee of the audit client; or (3) act as an advocate for the client. Prohibited non-audit
services include:
* Bookkeeping services. Providing any bookkeeping services is prohibited, unless it is reasonable
to conclude that the results of such services will not be subject to audit procedures.
* Human resources. The auditor is prevented from administering formal evaluations of the
client's employees or from otherwise advising the issuer on topics such as design of man-
agement structure or the hiring of specific candidates.
* Broker-dealer and investment advisor services. Prohibits performing investment advisory or bro-
kerage services for audit clients in order to prevent an auditor from serving as an unregistered
broker-dealer to audit clients.
* Expert services. The audit firm is prohibited from providing expert opinions or other ser-
vices for an audit client in relation to litigation, administrative, or regulatory actions or
proceedings.
* Tax services. An auditor is permitted to offer tax services to an audit client if the service is
approved in advance by the issuer's audit committee and the amount of fees paid to the
accounting firm for tax services is disclosed pursuant to the expanded disclosure requirements
outlined below.
Other non-audit services are not explicitly prohibited, but engaging in them for a client
will be deemed to compromise a public accounting firm's independence and make them
ineligible to perform audit services for that same client. These include:
* Financial information services. An accounting firm is deemed not independent if it directly or
indirectly supervises or operates the audit client's information system or local area network,
or if the accountant designs or implements either hardware or software responsible for ag-
gregating source data significant to the client's financial statements.
* Appraisal services and fairness opinions. An auditor is deemed not independent if it provides
appraisal services or contribution-in-kind reports or fairness opinions.
* Actuarial services. An accounting firm is deemed not independent if it provides any actuarially-
oriented advisory service involving the determination of amounts set forth in the financial
statements (and related accounts).
* Outsourcing of internal audits. An auditor is not independent if it provides internal audit ser-
vices for the issuer related to internal accounting controls, financial systems, or financial
statements.
* Management functions. An auditor is no longer independent if any of its employees acts,
temporarily or permanently, as a director, officer, or employee of the audit client or performs
any decision-making, supervisory, or ongoing monitoring function for the audit client.
14. See Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg.
6006-01 (May 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249 and 274).
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* Legal services. An auditor (whether a U.S. or foreign accounting firm) lacks independence if
it provides any service that could be provided only by someone qualified to practice law in
the jurisdiction where the service is provided.
b. Oversight of Auditors by the Audit Committee
An issuer's audit committee must pre-approve all non-audit services. The engagement
must be approved by the audit committee or commenced pursuant to detailed, pre-approved
procedures established by the audit committee.
The public accounting firm, registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board and auditing an issuer's financial statement, is required to timely report the following
information to the audit committee, prior to the filing of such audit report with the SEC:
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices used by the issuer; (2) the use of alternative
accounting treatments within GAAP, policies and practices related to material items that
have been discussed with management, including the potential consequences of this alter-
native treatment and the treatment that is preferred by the accounting firm; and (3) all other
material written communications between the audit firm and the management of the issuer,
such as recommendations for internal controls, management representation letters, en-
gagement letters, independence letters, and schedules of material adjustments and reclas-
sifications proposed, as well as any such material adjustments not recorded.
c. Auditor Independence and Conflicts of Interest
The rules require rotation of certain audit partners on a five-year basis in order to provide
audit services to an issuer."5 The lead and concurring audit partners must be rotated after
five years and, after rotation, subjected to a five-year "time out" period during which they
cannot service the audit client. All other audit partners are required to be rotated after no
more than seven years and, after rotation, subjected to a two-year "time out" period.
An accounting firm cannot perform an audit for an issuer if a CEO, controller, chief
financial officer, chief accounting officer, or any person serving in an equivalent position
for the issuer, was employed by that registered public accounting firm and participated in
any capacity in the audit of that issuer during the one-year period preceding the date of
the initiation of the audit.
An auditor's independence is compromised if, during the audit engagement period, any
audit partner earns or receives compensation based on selling, to that audit client, engage-
ments to provide any services other than audit, review, or attest services. In addition, an
issuer must identify in its filings with the SEC all fees paid to the auditing firm for the two
most recent fiscal years, classifying them under the categories Audit Fees, Audit-Related
Fees, Tax Fees, and All Other Fees.
5. Non-GAAP Financial Measures
On January 23, 2003, the SEC adopted final rules under section 401(b) of Sarbanes-
Oxley designed to ensure that investors are not misled by the use of methodologies differing
from GAAP
15. The rules define "audit partner" to include partners on the audit engagement team: (1) who have
decision-making responsibility on auditing, accounting, and reporting matters that affect the financial state-
ments; or (2) who maintain regular contact with management and the audit committee. Id.
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a. Regulation G
These rules include Regulation G, which applies when any SEC-reporting entity other
than a registered investment company publicly discloses or releases any material informa-
tion that includes a financial measure not calculated and presented in accordance with
GAAP (a non-GAAP financial measure).16 This is defined as a numerical measure of an
issuer's historical or future financial performance, financial position, or cash flow that:
(1) excludes amounts that are included in the most directly comparable measure calculated
in accordance with GAAP in the statement of income, balance sheet, or statement of cash
flows; or (2) includes amounts that are excluded from the most directly comparable
measure. 7
As part of the disclosure or release of the non-GAAP financial measure, Regulation G
requires the issuer to provide (1) a presentation of the most directly comparable GAAP
financial measure; and (2) a quantitative reconciliation of the difference between the non-
GAAP financial measure and the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure.
Regulation G does not apply to public disclosure of a non-GAAP financial measure by
a foreign private issuer if: (1) the securities of the foreign private issuer are listed or quoted
on a securities exchange or inter-dealer quotation system outside the United States; (2) the
non-GAAP financial measure is not derived from or based on a measure calculated and
presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP; and (3) the disclosure is made outside the United
States or is included in a written communication that is released outside the United States.
This exception for foreign private issuers will continue to apply even if: (a) foreign or U.S.
journalists or other parties have access to the information; (b) following the disclosure or
release of the information outside the United States, the information is submitted to the
SEC under cover of a Form 6-K, and/or (c) a written communication is released in the
United States, as well as outside the United States, so long as the communication is released
in the United States at the same time or after its release outside the United States and is
not otherwise targeted at persons located in the United States.
The rule also includes an exception for disclosures relating to business combination trans-
actions. Regulation G does not apply to non-GAAP financial measures included in disclo-
sure relating to a proposed business combination transaction, the entity resulting from the
transaction, or an entity that is a party to the transaction if the disclosure is contained in a
communication that is subject to the communication rules of the SEC applicable to business
combination transactions.
b. Non-GAAP Financial Measures in Filings with the SEC
The final rules also amended existing regulations and forms to require enhanced disclo-
sure concerning the use of non-GAAP financial measures in filings made with the SEC
with respect to a fiscal period ending after March 28, 2003. The amendments require that
issuers using non-GAAP financial measures in filings with the SEC provide: (1) a presen-
tation of the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure; (2) a quantitative recon-
ciliation of the differences between the non-GAAP financial measures disclosed with the
16. See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. 15939 (Mar. 28, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 244 and 249).
17. For foreign private issuers whose primary financial statements are prepared according to non-U.S.
GAAP; GAAP will also "include" the principles under which those primary financial statements are prepared.
See id.
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most directly comparable GAAP financial measures; (3) a statement describing the reasons
why the issuer's management believes the non-GAAP financial measures provide useful
information to investors regarding the issuer's financial condition and results of operations;
and (4) to the extent material, a statement disclosing the additional purposes for which the
issuer's management uses the non-GAAP financial measure that is not otherwise disclosed.
As under Regulation G, if a forward-looking non-GAAP financial measure is disclosed
or released, a quantitative reconciliation to a forward-looking GAAP is required. If a
forward-looking GAAP is not accessible for purposes of reconciliation, the issuer must
disclose that fact, explain why it is not accessible, and provide any reconciling information
that is available without unreasonable effort. Furthermore, the issuer must identify infor-
mation that is unavailable and disclose its probable significance.
The amendments prohibit the use of certain non-GAAP financial measures, including:
(1) non-GAAP liquidity measures, other than earnings before interest and taxes and
EBITDA measures, that exclude charges and liabilities that required, or will require, cash
settlements; (2) non-GAAP performance measures adjusted to eliminate or smooth items
identified as non-recurring when, by the nature of the charge or gain, it is reasonably likely
to recur within two years, or a similar charge or gain has occurred with the last two years;
and (3) non-GAAP financial measures presented on the face of the issuer's GAAP financial
statements or the accompanying notes or in pro-forma financial statements. The final
amendments do not prohibit the use of non-GAAP per share financial measures unless
specifically prohibited under GAAP or SEC rules.
Unlike Regulation G, the amendments do not contain an exception for foreign private
issuers. An otherwise prohibited non-GAAP measure would be permitted, however, in a
foreign private issuer's 20-F filing if expressly permitted under the foreign private issuer's
local GAAP and used by the issuer in its home country annual report or financial statements.
The same exception for disclosures related to business combination transactions that
applies under Regulation G applies under the enhanced disclosure requirements.
c. Form 8-K Amendment
The final rules also require that issuers (other than foreign private issuers) furnish a Form
8-K within five business days of any public announcement disclosing material non-public
information regarding the company's results of operations or financial condition for an
annual or quarterly fiscal period that has ended. In addition, earnings releases must be
furnished as an exhibit to the filing. These rules do not apply to press releases or other
communications regarding earnings guidance or estimates; however, only disclosures con-
cerning a completed annual or quarterly fiscal period would trigger the requirement.
If non-public information is disclosed orally, telephonically, by webcast, broadcast, or
similar means, the issuer is not required to furnish an additional 8-K if (1) the disclosure
occurs within 48 hours of a written release furnished to the SEC on Form 8-K- (2) the
presentation is accessible to the public by dial-in conference call, webcast, or similar tech-
nology; (3) the information contained in the presentation is available on the issuer's website,
together with any information required under Regulation G; and (4) the presentation was
announced by a widely disseminated press release.
B. SEC GUIDANCE REGARDING MANAGEMENT'S DiSCUSSiON AND ANALYSIS OF FiNANcIAL
CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
On December 19, 2003, the SEC issued new interpretive guidance with respect to the
preparation of Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
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of Operations (MD&A).8 The release seeks "to elicit more meaningful disclosure" that is
"informative and transparent."'' 9 The release does not modify existing requirements or im-
pose new requirements but instead encourages companies to review and improve the fol-
lowing areas of MD&A: overall presentation, focus and content, disclosure regarding li-
quidity and capital resources, and disclosure regarding critical accounting estimates.
1. Overall Presentation
The SEC notes that MD&A is often unnecessarily lengthy and difficult to understand
and makes several formatting recommendations to make disclosure more comprehensible.
These recommendations include presenting relevant financial and other information in
tabular format, using headings to aid readers follow the flow of information, and, in order
to avoid burying important information, applying a layered approach that emphasizes the
most important information by placing it before less-relevant information.
In addition, the release suggests including an introductory section or overview that iden-
tifies the most important matters with which management is concerned in evaluating the
company's financial condition and operating performance. A good introduction would pro-
vide a balanced, executive-level presentation that includes discussion of economic or
industry-wide factors relevant to the company; ways in which the company earns revenues
and income and generates cash, the company's business, products and services to the extent
necessary or useful, and material opportunities; and challenges and risks on which the com-
pany's executives are focused for both the short and long term, as well as any action man-
agement is taking to address these concerns.
2. Content and Focus
Companies may need to go beyond financial measures in order to identify all "key vari-
ables and other qualitative and quantitative factors peculiar to and necessary for an under-
standing of the individual company."2 0 The release suggests that companies consider
including a discussion and analysis, where relevant, of non-financial variables such as macro-
economic measures, industry-specific measures, or company-specific measures.
Companies should review all public disclosures not included in SEC filings, whether
made in publicly accessible analyst calls, website postings, or any other means, to determine
whether they contain material information that is either specifically required or that would
promote a better understanding of MD&A.
MD&A should not include information that is neither material nor useful. Discussion of
issues presented in previous periods should be reduced or omitted where they are no longer
material or helpful and segment data should only be discussed to the extent necessary for
an understanding of consolidated information.
Disclosure in MD&A of a known trend, demand, commitment, event, or uncertainty is
required unless a company is able to conclude either that it is not reasonably likely to occur,
or it is not reasonably likely to have a material effect on the company's liquidity, capital
resources, or results of operations.
18. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75056 (interpreted on Dec. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts.
211, 231 and 241).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The focus of MD&A should be on an analysis that explains the reasons for and the
implications of particular material developments, rather than a mere narrative restatement
of financial statements. Further, appropriate MD&A disclosure may be required if there is
a reasonable likelihood that reported financial information is not indicative of a company's
future financial condition or operating performance.
3. Liquidity and Capital Resources
The basic objective of this section of MD&Ais to provide a clear picture of the company's
ability to generate cash to meet existing and known, or reasonably likely, future cash re-
quirements over both the short and long term. A simple statement that a company has
sufficient resources to meet its cash requirements generally is insufficient. Additional in-
formation that is material to an understanding of disclosed cash requirements should also
be disclosed, including incurrence of material debt and difficulties associated with the
amount and timing of uncertain events, such as loss contingencies.
MD&A should not be limited by the accounting presentation but should instead identify
material changes in operating, investing, and financing cash flows and the reasons under-
lying those changes. A company should also provide a discussion and analysis of the types
of financing that are likely available, or those that the company would like to use but are
not likely available, and the impact on the company's cash position and liquidity. Also,
companies generally have some degree of flexibility in determining when and how to use
their cash reserves to satisfy obligations and make other capital expenditures. Thus,
the MD&A should describe known material trends and uncertainties relating to such
determinations.
4. Debt Instruments, Guarantees and Related Covenants
The release identifies two scenarios where a discussion and analysis of material covenants
related to outstanding debt or guarantees may be required. First, companies that are, or
are reasonably likely to be, in breach of covenants related to outstanding debt or guarantees
should analyze the impact of such breach on the company and discuss the steps being taken
to address the breach. Second, companies should discuss any covenants that limit, or are
reasonably likely to limit, the company's ability to take on additional debt or equity fi-
nancing and should analyze and discuss the consequences of such limitations. In both sce-
narios, a discussion of alternative sources of funding should be included.
5. Critical Accounting Policies
In May 2002, the SEC proposed rules that would significantly broaden the scope of
required disclosures with respect to the methods, assumptions, and estimates underlying
companies' critical accounting measurements. These rules remain under consideration and
are not covered in the release. Instead, the release provides guidance with respect to dis-
closure of critical accounting estimates under the rules that currently are in force.
Under existing requirements, accounting estimates or assumptions may require disclosure
in MD&A where: (1) the nature of the estimates or assumptions is material due to the high
levels of subjectivity and judgment needed to account for highly uncertain matters or the
susceptibility of such matters to change; or (2) the impact of the estimates and assumptions
on the company's financial condition or operating performance is material. Any such dis-
closure should not duplicate the description included in the notes to the financial statements
but should present the company's analysis of the uncertainties involved in applying the
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relevant principles at a given time or the variability that is likely to result from such appli-
cation over time.
C. RESEARCH ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
1. Global Analyst Research Settlements
On April 28, 2003, the SEC filed complaints against ten of the United States' top in-
vestment firms and two individuals, along with the defendants' consents and proposed judg-
ments (the Global Analyst Research Settlements)." The complaints alleged that all of the
investment firms exerted inappropriate influence over research analysts through policies
and procedures that created conflicts of interest.2 In addition, all of the defendants were
said to have issued research reports that were fraudulent, misleading, or otherwise not based
on principles of good faith and fair dealing.3 The defendants neither admitted nor denied
the allegations.24
On October 31, 2003, the Southern District of New York approved the final judgments
requiring the defendants to pay a little more than $1.4 billion in penalties, disgorgement,
and funding for independent research and investigation. In addition, the judgments required
all of the investment firm defendants to make "dramatic reforms" to their future practices.,,
Among the reforms agreed to were: (1) severing all links between the research and invest-
ment banking departments in investment firms; (2) making independent research available
to investors whereby no fewer than three independent research firms must be used for a
period of five years; and (3) making its analysts' historical ratings and price target forecasts
publicly available, enabling investors to evaluate and compare the analysts' performance.26
The Global Research Analyst Settlements were a result of a SEC investigation into re-
search analysts' conflicts of interest.27 Particularly, the SEC was concerned that investors
were relying on analysts' recommendations without realizing that such recommendations
could be tainted by the internal policies and procedures of the investment firms.28 For
example, investors may have been unaware that an analyst's firm could use favorable re-
search coverage to market its investment bank services or that an analyst's compensation
could be based significantly on generating investment banking business.9 In short, sub-
21. See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 03 Civ. 2937 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); SEC v. Jack Benjamin Grubman,
No. 03 Civ. 2938 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2939 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v.
Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2940 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2941 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v. U.S. Bancorp PiperJaffray, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2942 (S.D.N.Y
2003); SEC v. UBS Securities LLC, f/k/a UBS Warburg LLC, No. 03 Civ. 2943 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); SEC v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 03 Civ. 2944 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., f£k/a
Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2945 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC,
f/k/a Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., No. 03 Civ. 2946 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v. Henry McKelvey Blodget,
No. 03 Civ. 2947 (S.D.N.Y 2003); SEC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 03 Civ. 2948 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
22. Securities Exchange Commission, Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Statement, Liti-
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stantial conflicts of interest existed that caused many analysts to issue reports that did not
reflect their true beliefs.?° Moreover, these conflicts of interest remained undisclosed to the
investors relying on the reports in making their investment decisions.
2. Regulation AC
The rule that came out of the SEC investigation into such conflicts of interest is Regu-
lation Analyst Certification (Regulation AC), which actually became effective two weeks
prior to the filing of the Global Research Analyst Settlements." Regulation AC, together
with the Global Analyst Research Settlements and separate rules from the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), is intended
to address the issues and conflicts of interest that were inherent in the procedures and
processes by which analysts' reports were produced and made available to the public.
2
Regulation AC requires that certain certifications be made in connection with research
reports and that certain certifications be made in connection with public appearances.
33
In connection with research reports, any brokers, dealers, or "covered persons"-as de-
fined in Regulation AC-that publish, circulate, or provide reports must include within the
research reports:
(1) a statement certifying that the views expressed in the report are the personal views of the
research analyst; and
(2) a statement certifying either:
(a) no part of the compensation paid to the analyst will be directly or indirectly related to
the views or recommendations expressed in the report; or
(b) that part or all of the compensation paid to the analyst is, was, or will be directly or
indirectly related to the views or recommendations expressed in the report and that
such compensation (identifying the source, amount, and purpose) may influence the
recommendation in the research report.
34
In connection with public appearances, any brokers or dealers that publish, circulate, or
provide a research report, developed by a research analyst employed by them, to a person
in the United States must make a record within thirty days after any calendar quarter in
which the analyst made a public appearance that includes: (1) a statement by the analyst
attesting that the views expressed during the public appearances in the calendar quarter are
personally-held views; and (2) a written statement by the analyst certifying that no part of
the compensation paid to the analyst will be directly or indirectly related to the views or
recommendations expressed in any such public appearances in the calendar quarter."
To the extent that a broker or dealer does not obtain the statements needed from the analyst,
the broker or dealer must notify its examining authority and must, for 120 days following
the notification, disclose that the certification was not provided in any research report it
distributes authored by the analyst.
3 6
30. Id.
31. Regulation AC, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-242.505 (2003).
32. See supra note 27.
33. Regulation AC, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.501-242.502 (2003).
34. Regulation AC, 17 C.F.R. § 242.501 (2003).
35. Regulation AC, 17 C.F.R. § 242.502 (2003).
36. Id.
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11. Developments in the United Kingdom
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Corporate governance continued to be important in 2003, with the publication of many
corporate governance-related reports, particularly the Higgs and Smith Reports." Increas-
ingly, institutional shareholders are making their views known, as in October 2003, when
institutional shareholders forced Michael Green to step down as chairman of Carlton, a
broadcasting company that was merging with Granada, another broadcasting company,
because the shareholders wanted an independent non-executive chairman from outside both
companies.3 8
The Higgs Report on the effectiveness of non-executive directors of listed companies
was published in January 2003, together with the Smith Report on audit committees. Some
of the Higgs proposals were not well received and were watered down in the new Combined
Code published in July 2003, which is the main corporate governance framework for UK-
listed companies. 39
Compliance with the Code is not mandatory; the Listing Rules require a "comply or
explain" approach leaving companies the option to either confirm compliance or explain
their reasons for non-compliance.4 Compliance, however, is something that investor pro-
tection bodies, such as the Association of British Insurers, will look at when considering
their voting policies and whether or not they recommend their members to vote for or
against resolutions. The July 2003 Combined Code is effective for listed companies with
reporting years beginning on or after November 1, 2003. 41 The new Code is considerably
longer than the 1998 version, which is still applicable to companies with reporting years
that began prior to November 1, 2003. The new Code also includes a definition of inde-
pendence in relation to non-executive directors, a stronger role for the audit committee in
accordance with the recommendations of the Smith Report, clarification of the roles of the
chairman and senior non-executive director, and the requirement that the chief executive
not go on to become the chairman of the same company other than in exceptional cases. 42
B. FSA DEVELOPMENTS
The Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UK regulator, is currently engaged in a
fundamental review of the UK listing regime. This is taking place alongside various Eu-
37. RmVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (H-ggs Report) (Jan. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/nonexec-review/pdfi/higgsreport.pdf (last visited June 9, 2004); AUDIT
COMMITTEES: COMBINED CODE GUIDANCE (Smith Report) (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.asb.org.uk/
documents/pdf/acreport.pdf (last visited June 9, 2004). Additional useful websites include the FSA website(http://www.fsa.gov.uk) and the Financial Reporting Council website (http://www.frc.org.uk) where copies of
the Higgs Report, the Smith Report, and the new Combined Code may also be found.
38. See, e.g., Tim Burt, Gautam Malkani & Tony Tassell, Carlton and Granada try to beat rifts, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 22, 2003.
39. Combined Code on Corporate Governance (July 2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/
lr._comcode2003.pdf [hereinafter Combined Code].
40. Listing Rules of the UKLA, §12.43A.
41. Combined Code, supra note 39, item 3.
42. Id. § A.2.1.
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ropean developments in this area, including the Prospectus Directive." Feedback from the
FSA is expected in the third quarter of 2004 with implementation in summer 2005. This
is the earliest date that the Prospectus Directive is expected to be implemented in the United
Kingdom. Implementation of the overhaul of the regime will be delayed if implementation
of the Directive is delayed.
The FSA's consultation paper was published in October 2003, and includes some radical
proposals such as the introduction of high level principles in addition to the listing rules; a
requirement for overseas issuers with a primary listing in the United Kingdom to conform
to the same standards as UK issuers; a new requirement for shareholder approval prior to
delisting; and the possible removal of the requirement for issuers to have sponsors, who
currently advise issuers on their obligations under the listing rules.4
A number of these proposals have been criticized, either by bodies such as the Company
Law Committee of the Law Society of England and Wales or by market participants. A
critical overhaul of the listing regime is to be welcomed, however, and we await the outcome
with interest.
C. STEP CHANGE IN THE USE OF SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT IN TAKEOVERS
The last twelve months have seen a shift in attitude in favor of using schemes of arrange-
ment to effect a takeover. Most of the highest profile deals of the past year-the Morrisons
bid for Safeways, the CVC sponsored bid for Debenhams, the Hicks Muse sponsored bid
for Weetabix, and the Morgan Stanley sponsored bid for Canary Wharf-have utilised
schemes that challenge many orthodox perceptions.
A scheme of arrangement is a procedure provided by section 425 of the Companies Act
1985 whereby, in a takeover context, a target company's shares are cancelled and then
reissued, or simply transferred, to the bidder in return for which the bidder pays the con-
sideration to the target's shareholders. 45 Technically, a scheme is an arrangement between
the target company and its shareholders, in contrast to an offer, which is a proposal made
by the bidder directly to the target's shareholders.
Schemes have now been shown to bring advantages of certainty, speed, and security for
both the bidder and its lenders. These benefits may reduce bank costs in leveraged offers
and in turn give schemes a cost advantage. For example, attaining 100 percent control is
almost always quicker under a scheme. A scheme-unlike an offer-delivers 100 percent
control as soon as the scheme becomes effective, which occurs after it has been approved
by a court. Another interesting point is the advantage a scheme can give where the target
has a substantial number of U.S. shareholders and shares form part or all of the consider-
ation, as the offeror will gain an exemption from registration under section 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. We expect to see a rise in the use of schemes in 2004,
particularly for leveraged transactions and public to private transactions.
43. Council Directive 2003/71/EC, 2003 Oj. (L 345) 64.
44. Financial Services Authority, Review of the Listing Regime Consultation Paper 203 (Oct. 2003), availabk
at http-J/www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp203.pdf (last visited May 30, 2004). Note that in May 2004, the FSA
published a consultation indicating that the proposed requirements for shareholder approval prior to delisting
would probably be introduced by the end of 2004 (http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp04_08.pdf).
45. Companies Act 1985 §425.
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m. Developments in The Netherlands
A. EUROPE
As The Netherlands is a Member State of the European Union, the developments of
Dutch securities regulations are determined principally by European developments. Thus,
this overview will be limited to Dutch developments only. Nonetheless, the publication of
the Prospectus Directive and the Market Abuse Directive- on December 31, 2003 and
April 12, 2003, respectively, should be mentioned here, as these Directives must be imple-
mented in national legislation in the course of 2004 and 2005.
B. ONGOING RESTRUCTURING OF SUPERVISION OF FINANCL4 MARKETS
The restructuring of the supervision of financial markets, which began in 2002, continued
in 2003. The Ministry of Finance published a draft of the first chapter of the (new) Act on
Financial Supervision (Wet op hetfinancieel toezicbt) and all market parties were invited to
give their view on this drafty' This new Act will replace most of the current financial
supervisory legislation, including the 1995 Act on the Supervision of the Security Trade
(Wet toezicbt effectenverkeer 1995) (the 1995 Securities Act), the 1992 Act on the Supervision
of the Credit System (Wet toezicbt kredietwezen 1992), the Act on the Supervision of
Investment Institutions (Wet toezicbt beleggingsinstellingen), and the 1996 Act on the Dis-
closure of Holding in Listed Companies (Wet melding zeggenscbap in ter beurze genoteerde
vennootschappen 1996). The Act on Financial Supervision will be divided into four chapters:
(1) general; (2) prudential supervision; (3) market conduct supervision; and (4) infrastructure
financial markets. The effective date of the Act on Financial Supervision is currently sched-
uled for July 1, 2005.
In anticipation of the implementation of the Act on Financial Supervision, certain amend-
ments of the existing legislation became effective in 2003, the most relevant of which are
as follows.
1. Act on the Expansion of Supervision on Securities-related Market Conduct (Wet uitbreiding
effectentypisch gedragstoezicht)
On December 1, 2003, the Act on the Expansion of Supervision on Securities-related
Market Conduct (Wet uitbreiding effectentypisch gedragstoezicht) became effective. 41 Pursuant
to this Act, the securities-related market conduct supervision by the Netherlands Authority
for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiele Markten) was expanded to all financial in-
stitutions that are active on the financial markets and that are not yet subject to the market
conduct rules in accordance with the 1995 Securities Act, such as insurance companies and
pension funds. The relevant market conduct rules relate to sound market behavior, includ-
ing insider knowledge, private investment transactions, and prevention of conflicts of
interest.
46. Council Directive 2003/6/EC, 2003 OJ. (L 96) 16.
47. As published on the website of the Ministry of Justice at http://www.minfin.nl/consultatieherziening
toezicht (last visited May 29, 2004).
48. Staatsblad 2003, no. 103.
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2. Amendment Exemption Regulation
Effective June 19, 2003, the Dutch 1995 Securities Act Exemption Regulation was
amended. 49 This amendment relaxed the exemptions under which securities may be offered
by Dutch issues or on the Dutch market, including: (1) the possibility of combining the so-
called professionals exemption (offer to professional investors only) and the non-Dutch
residents exemption (offer to non-Dutch residents only); and (2) as of December 1, 2003,
the introduction of an exemption for offers of securities which can only be acquired as a
package for a consideration (in cash or in kind) of at least EUR 50,000 or the equivalent
thereof in another currency.50
3. Draft legislation
In 2003, draft legislation was published regarding the supervision on providing financial
services, the supervision of financial reporting, and supervision on clearing institutions. This
draft legislation is subject to consultation." In addition, an amendment of the 1996 Act on
the Disclosure of Holding in Listed Companies (Wet melding zeggenschap in ter beurze gen-
oteerde vennootschappen 1996) was submitted to Parliament. This amendment is intended to
increase transparency of voting power and capital interest in listed companies, as well as to
simplify notification requirements.
IV. Developments in Canada
A. ATTEMPTS AT HARMONIZATION
In Canada, securities regulation currently takes place on a province-by-province basis.
Each province has its own securities statutes and, depending on the province, different types
of subordinate legislation, including: (1) rules made by the regulator; (2) regulations passed
by the cabinet; (3) blanket rulings issued by the regulators; (4) and policies made by the
regulators. When a particular matter relates to more than one province, the result is a
multiplicity of regulation and the need to deal with anywhere from two to thirteen regu-
lators arises. While the federal government has the power constitutionally to regulate in
the securities area, it has only done so in the past to a very limited degree.
This multiplicity of regulation is becoming more and more of an issue in Canada, both
from an efficient and competitive markets point of view and from a political point of view,
with some provinces in favor of a single federal regulator and other provinces opposed to
the idea. In March 2003, the federal government appointed the so-called "Wise Persons'
Committee" to assess the existing system of securities regulation in Canada and to rec-
ommend the securities regulatory structure that will best meet Canada's needs. In Decem-
ber 2003, the committee reported and recommended that the Canadian government enact
a new Federal Securities Act that provides a comprehensive scheme of capital markets
regulation for Canada and is administered by a single regulator. The matter is currently
before the federal government, but so long as certain provinces continue to oppose this
49. Staatscourant 2003, no. 113.
50. Saatscourant 2003, no. 231.
51. Drafts of the Act on the supervision on financial reporting and the Act on the Supervision on Clearing
Institutions have been published on the website of the Ministry ofJustice at http://www.minfin.nl (last visited
May 29, 2004).
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initiative, the matter continues to remain very sensitive in nature and the practice of se-
curities regulation in Canada continues to take on added complexity.
While some provinces are opposed to federal regulation, all provinces recognize that the
status quo cannot continue. As a result, various provincial regulators are continuing to work
together on harmonization of the existing securities laws. There are currently systems in
place where issuers can deal primarily with one regulator in obtaining a receipt for a pro-
spectus or relief from securities laws (although no province actually cedes jurisdiction to
another). In addition, when making subordinate legislation, the regulators are attempting
to make it as national in scope as possible by having all regulators adopt it, but again, that
is not always the case.
The regulators also published for comment framework uniform securities legislation to
be adopted in each province in order to avoid a multiplicity of laws. This framework is
currently out for comment. Unlike the current mutual reliance system, the legislation would
provide for delegation to take place among provinces and would provide for passport or
one-stop shopping for issuers and registrants.
The Canadian securities regulators also continue to take note of the increasing inter-
dependence between the Canadian and U.S. markets. As one of their initiatives in 2003,
the regulators issued a notice indicating that they will now grant exemptions to reporting
issuers, the term used to describe Canadian public companies, that have a class of securities
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or are required to file
reports under section 15(d) of that Act, which permits them to use U.S. GAAP and U.S.
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) for interim and annual financial reporting
periods. This exemption will not relieve reporting issuers from any requirements imposed
by Canadian corporate legislation to prepare and distribute to shareholders financial state-
ments prepared in accordance with Canadian GAAP and audited in accordance with Ca-
nadian GAAS.
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES
While Canada has not had the magnitude of corporate scandals that have taken place in
the United States and Europe, Canadian regulators followed the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
very closely and, in order to address the issue of investor confidence and to maintain the
reputation of Canadian markets generally, decided to implement certain investor confidence
instruments and certain suggested corporate governance standards. These have not been
adopted by all provinces, and in much of this area, the British Columbia government has
decided to pursue its own course. A brief summary of these instruments follows.
1. Audit Committees
The securities commissions in all provinces, other than British Columbia, enacted a
uniform instrument on audit committees. This instrument is derived from the audit com-
mittee requirements in Sarbanes-Oxley, certain requirements of the SEC, and listing re-
quirements of the NYSE and Nasdaq. The instrument governs the composition and re-
sponsibilities of audit committees and requires issuers to disclose significant information in
their annual filings with respect to their audit committees and their auditors. Subject to
limited exceptions, the rule requires all Canadian reporting issuers to have an audit com-
mittee composed of at least three members. Again, subject to certain exceptions, each mem-
ber must be "independent" and must be financially literate. The definition of independence
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is based upon corresponding definitions currently in place for NYSE and Nasdaq listed
issuers.
The instrument requires that an audit committee have a written charter that sets out its
mandates and responsibilities. These responsibilities include: (1) recommending to the
board the external auditors to be nominated for appointment by the shareholders and the
auditor's compensation; (2) overseeing the work of the external auditor; (3) resolving any
disagreements between management and the external auditors with respect to financial
reporting; (4) pre-approving any non-audit services provided by the external auditor;
(5) reviewing the issuer's financial statements, MD&A, and earnings press releases before
they are publicly disclosed; and (6) establishing procedures for dealing with whistle blowing
complaints. The instrument contains broad exceptions for issuers with securities listed or
quoted on a U.S. marketplace, so long as they comply with the audit committee require-
ments of that marketplace.
2. Certification of Financial Statements
This instrument provides for certification requirements very similar to those found under
Sarbanes-Oxley. Its stated purpose is to improve the quality and reliability of a reporting
issuer's annual and interim disclosure. The instrument requires an issuer's CEO and CFO
to personally certify an issuer's annual information form-the Canadian equivalent of a
U.S. 10-K-its annual financial statements and MD&A, and its quarterly financial state-
ments and MD&A. The executives must certify that, to their knowledge: (1) the filings do
not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, or omit a material fact required to be
stated, or fail to state a material fact that is necessary to make a statement not misleading
in light of the circumstances under which it was made with respect to the relevant financial
period; and (2) the financial statements and other financial information included in the
filings fairly present, in all material respects, the financial condition, results of operations,
and cashflows of the issuer for the relevant period. The executives must also certify that
they designed appropriate disclosure controls, procedures, and internal controls over fi-
nancial reporting and evaluated the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures
for the relevant .period. They must also certify that they included disclosure of any material
changes in the issuer's internal control over financial reporting in the annual MD&A. Fur-
thermore, the instrument provides an exemption for issuers that comply with the equivalent
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements and file Sarbanes-Oxley certificates in Canada.
3. Auditor Oversight Rule
This instrument requires reporting issuers to engage auditors that are participants in an
independent oversight program established by the Canadian Public Accountability Board
(the Board). The Board was created to address investor confidence concerning the credi-
bility of auditors and audited financial information. By registering and inspecting these
forms, the Board provides public oversight for accounting firms that audit reporting issuers.
The instrument requires that an auditor of a reporting issuer must be a public accounting
firm that has entered into a participation agreement with the Board.
4. Corporate Governance
Until recently, corporate governance has been within the purview of the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX) alone, as the provincial securities commissions generally observed a de-
lineation between securities law and corporate law. The TSX did not mandate corporate
governance practices, but it set out a number of corporate governance guidelines and
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required all listed companies to address compliance with these guidelines in its disclosure
documents.
The provincial securities commissions, other than British Columbia and Quebec, adopted
a policy and rule on corporate governance for most reporting issuers. The stated purpose
of these instruments is to confirm, as best practice, certain governance standards and guide-
lines that evolved through legislative reforms, regulatory reforms, and the initiatives of
other capital market participants. The instruments were substantially derived from the TSX
guidelines. The policy provides guidance on effective corporate governance and sets out
eighteen recommended best practices, and the rule requires mandatory disclosure of gov-
ernance practices. While the best practices guidelines are not mandatory, if they are not
followed, the rule usually requires issuers to disclose why its board considers the alternative
practices appropriate.
5. Proposed Federal Market Fraud Legislation
In 2002, the federal government acknowledged that, in light of the recent U.S. scandals,
efforts were necessary to bolster investor confidence in Canadian capital markets. The
federal government pledged to review and change relevant federal laws and strengthen
enforcement activities where necessary. The federal government has proposed legislation
which will come into force on a date to be determined by the Cabinet, to accomplish these
objectives. The legislation: (1) creates a new Criminal Code offense for improper insider
trading; (2) provides whistleblower protection to employees who report unlawful conduct;
(3) increases the maximum sentences for existing fraud offenses and establish a list of ag-
gravating factors to aid the courts in sentencing; and (4) allows courts to issue production
orders in order to obtain data and documents from persons not under investigation.
C. OTHER INITIATIVES
1. Regulation of Income Trusts
In the last few years, Canadian capital markets were dominated by income fund offerings.
Packaging assets into an income fund is very advantageous from the vendor's perspective,
as it frequently provides the most favorable valuation of the assets. From the investor's
perspective, income funds are viewed as a high-yield, tax-effective, and moderate-risk al-
ternative to fixed-income securities. The most common candidates for income fund offer-
ings are businesses that offer a comparatively reliable cash flow, with limited future growth
potential, and modest capital expenditures.
All of the Canadian securities commissions recently decided to regulate this area by
introducing a policy intended to deal with certain disclosure inadequacies that regulators
observed in such funds, including inadequacies resulting from indirect offerings of the
operating entity's securities underlying the income fund. This policy is currently out for
comment, and the regulators are likely to proceed with it in the coming year.
2. Insider Reporting of Equity Monetization and Other Derivative Transactions
An equity monetization transaction is designed to provide a security holder with a cash
amount approaching the amount that they would receive on the sale of its securities, while
shifting all or part of the economic risk associated with the securities without an actual
change in ownership. Because of the latter characteristic, many of these transactions were
not reported in the past, as Canadian securities legislation only required the insiders of a
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reporting issuer to report changes in beneficial ownership or control, as well as direction
over the securities of reporting issuers.
The provincial securities commissions across Canada now have adopted instruments that
require reporting of many of these transactions. These rules expand the scope of insider
reporting to include agreements, arrangements, or understandings that alter, directly or
indirectly, the insider's economic interest in a security of the reporting issuer or economic
exposure to the reporting issuer.
As a result, unless specifically exempted, any derivatives-based transaction by an insider
relating to securities of a reporting issuer that was not previously reportable must now be
reported. Limited recourse loans secured by a pledge of securities of the relevant reporting
issuer may also be reportable in certain circumstances. Certain compensation arrangements
between a reporting issuer and its insiders that were not previously required to be reported
may now be reportable as well.
3. Continuous Disclosure Obligations
Reporting issuers in Canada are subject to significant continuous disclosure obligations.
Many of these are similar to obligations imposed upon U.S. issuers. Until recently, these
continuous disclosure obligations were imposed on a province-by-province basis and could
vary among provinces. The provincial securities commissions recently adopted a nationally
harmonized set of continuous disclosure requirements for reporting issuers. They also
adopted rules providing exemptions for certain foreign issuers. The continuous disclosure
rules both accelerate the time period for filing documents, such as financial statements,
annual information forms and MD&A, and also significantly expand the disclosure required
in annual information forms and MD&A. For example, in response to Enron and SEC-
related changes, MD&A must now include off-balance sheet arrangements, transactions
with related parties, critical accounting estimates, and changes in accounting policies.
Issuers must also discuss their use of financial instruments and other instruments that
may be settled by the delivery of non-financial assets. An issuer must discuss the nature of
its use of such instruments and the business purposes that they serve. An issuer must also
provide a discussion of risk management, including a separate discussion of hedging activ-
ities and details concerning the amounts of income, expenses, gains, and losses associated
with the instruments.
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